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Abatract
We diacuae two types of aimple foraging atrategiea for beea. Each of
theae explicit atrategiea explaim that in a multi-bee community the
beea will diatribute themselvea over the nectaraoureea aceordiag to the
Ideal Ftee Diatribution. At the same time theae atrategies explain that
in aingle-bee experimental eattinga a bee will match, by ita number
o[ visita, the nectar supply from the available aourcea (the Matching
Law). Moreover, botó atrategiea explain that in certain aituationa the
beea may behave ae if they are riak averae. Our reaulta indicate that
a competitive market in a multi-bee comawaity permita individuala
to be boundedly rational aad atill forage optimatly.
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1 Introduction
In animal behavior studies many experiments of the following type have
been done (Commons et al. 1982, Maynard-Smith 1982, Staddon 1983,
Houston 1983, Davison k McCazthy 1988, Menzel k Gregger 1992). An
animal subject can repeatedly choose from two different food sources that
give precisely the same quantity of the same food, however with different
frequencies. Suppose that, at each point in time, the yellow eource Y gives
one unit of food with probability p, and the blue source B gives one unit of
food with probability q(and 0 units otherwise~. These experiments reveal
that the animal subject behaves as if, asymptotically, it matches the reward
probabilities by the frequenciea of visiting the alternatives, i.e. the number
of visits to Y relates to the number of visits to B as p to q(cf. Staddon
1983, Houston dt Sumida 1987, Krebs dc Kacelnik 1991, Menzel k Gregger
1992). This kind of behavior has been called "the Matching LawT (see for
example Houston 1983, Krebs k Kacelnik 1991).
These single-animal experiments are closely related to so-called two-
azmed bandit problems in statistical decision theory, where a player wishes
to maximize his profits from playing a two-azmed gambling machine of
which one arm gives a greater probability of winning. The rational player,
not knowing the winning probabilities of the azms, ahould try to find the
more profitable arm and play it exclusively (DeGroot 1970, Rotschild 1974).
A behavior of matching the succes probabilities seems to be irrational
(Houston et al. 1982, Staddon 1983, Real 1992). One of our goals is to
explain this "irrational" behavior by presenting simple foraging strategies
that are optimal and rational in a multi-animal natural environment.
We show that in a multi-animal setting these strategies lead to what
is known as the Ideal Free Distribution (IFD, Fretwell 1972, Milinski k
Pazker 1991). Peleg 8c Shmida (1992) have proved the existence of the
IFD in a general framework of an environment with many flower types and3
bee types. To explain brie9y the IFD, consider n(identical) animale aad
two food sources Y and B where food is being aupplied with rates p and
q respectively. Then after some time a fraction p~(p t q) of the n animals
will be feeding at the Y source while a fraction of q~(p f q) will be at
B. Thus, the number of animals at Y relates to the number of animals
at B as p to q. In a natural multi-animal situation, establishing the IFD
seems to be the rational thing to do, since at the IFD the average intake
of food is the same at all food sources. The population is at equilibrium;
no animal can improve its payoff by feeding at another food source. When
non-cooperatively trying to establish the IFD is the ~natural" thing to do
for the animal, then in an artificial single-animal setting one may obaerve
irrational behavior.
When applying our strategies to a situation where the animal can choose
between two probabilistic food sources in which the food supply is normally
distributed with the same mean but with different variances, our result
shows that the animal will act as if it is risk averse or, as if it is risk prone
(sensu Real dt Cazaco 1986). An animal will act as if it is risk averse if ita
(individual) critical level is smaller than the mean, and risk prone other-
wise. Here the critical level is a threshold by which the animal judges each
quantity of food it obtains as being satisfactory or not. The aaimal will
prefer the food source with the smallest probability of getting something
below critical level.
For simplicity we shall talk about bees instead of animals in this paper.
Most of the wild bees, especially in the Mediterranean area, are solitary
bees which live about four-five weeks (Shmida et al. 1993). Each female
has its own nest and raises its brood alone. There is no exchange of foraging
information among bees. Each bee is assumed to be a maximizer of Daz-
winian fitness (Hammerstein dc Selten 1993), i.e. it maximizes its average
nectar intake per time unit. Nectar wíll be considered as the only reward for4
the bee in the model. Nectar is produced by flowers for the sole purpose of
attracting pollinators. Bees have no innate preference to particular flowera
(Heinrich 1979, Menzel 1985, 1990, Menzel dc Shmida 1992) and their for-
aging patterns appeaz to be influenced by experience. Experimenta reveal
that bees use mainly their short-term memory for decision-making in local
flower patches (Menzel 8c Gregger 1992) and take into account only the last
one or two flowers in the process of deciding on leaving or staying in a patch
of a given flower type (Rea1 et al. 1990, Cresswell 1990, Real 1991, 1992,
Kadmon dc Shmida 1992, Kadmon et aL 1992). The above experimental
result initiated our approach to assume that the bees have bounded recall.
The strategies we provide aze described by finite automata (Ben-Porath dc
Peleg 1987) by which the bees respond only to their own payoffs and re-
member only payoffs of the last few visits. In this paper we neither include
travel times nor handling times for the flower types. These parameters are
considered in some other models (Laverty 1980, Harder 1987, Friedman dt
Shmida 1992, Peleg dt Shmida 1992).
The two explicit strategies examined in this paper shall be called the e-
sampling strategy and the (ailures strategy. Briefly one could say that the
e-sampling strategy is to visit one alternative repeatedly, but every now and
then sampling on the other alternative and to switch if the other alternative
is better than the one previously selected. The failures atrategy describ~
an innate behavior leading to matching according to some simple finite
automaton (e.g. leave Y after y empty 9owers, leave B after 6 empty flow-
ers). The two behavioral strategies represent two alternative approaches
to model choice rules of foraging animals: resource dependent moves vs.
resource independent moves. These strategies will be discussed in sections
2 and 3 respectively, each with respect to multi-animal and single-animal
settings and in relation to risk. Section 4 concludes with some discussion
on related literature.5
To simplify notations we restrict our attention to the aituation where there
are only two food sources: Y (yellow) and B (blue). However, our results
can be extended to situations with any finite number of food sources.2 The e-Sampling Strategy
The e-sampling strategy is briefly described as follows. A foraging bee
which has to choose between two colored resources will use the following
rule: initially choose one of the colors at random, then at each point in time
stay at the current color with probability 1- e and sample the other color
with probability e; when sampling, if you find a payoff above your critical
level, then switch to this new color, otherwise return to the previous color
immediately; at this next color (new or old) again at each point in time stay
with probability 1-e, sample elsewhere with probability e. This E-sampling
strategy is close to Heinrich's (1979) idea of "Major-Minor behavior" of
bees, which motivated our reseazch.
Definition 2.1 Let a, e E (0,1), let a(t) E{Y, B} rcprescnt thc action
selected and !et r(t) E R be the payoff at time t E {1,2,3,...}.
Define c!(1) - 0 and
cl(t t 1) - acl(t) t(1 - a)r(t) (1)
for t~ 1. Then cl(t) is called the critieal level at time t.
Let Y. denote the mixed aetion: choose Y with probability 1- E and B
otherwise and let B. be defined similarly.
The E-aampling atrattgy is defcned 6y playing:
at t- 1 use Yo.s,
at t- 2 use a(1)~,
at t~ 2 ust a(t - 1)~ in case a(t - 1) ~ a(t - 2) and r(t - 1) ~ el(t - 1),
use a(t - 2)~ otherwise.
Note that equation (1) is the linear operator function originally used by
Bush 8a Mosteller (1955). In this definition the pazameters a and E are the
individual bee's factors. The first one is related to memory and the second
one to searching elsewhere. Those familiar with game theory can think of7
E as a bee's trcmbling hand (Selten 1975) trying to play a pure action. We
wish to emphasize that different individuals may have different parametera,
but our results remain the same.
Let N denote the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, ...}. Then, consider what
happens if we have a population of n E N bees that aze foraging on two
patches of flowers, a yellow patch Y and a blue patch B. Per unit of time
the yellow patch has a total nectaz supply of y E Rt, while there is a total
quantity of b E Rt at patch B. We make Lhe following asaumptions:
a. If at some stage t E N there aze ny bees at Y, then we assume that at
this stage each of these bees is receiving r(t) - y~ny units of nectar.
This means that the total quantity of nectaz at Y is being equally
distributed over the visiting bees at Y at each stage. Likewise for B.
b. There is no accumulation of nectar at a patch. All nectar is taken
by the bees at each stage and if at some stage there are no bees at a
patch then at the next stage the total quantity is still the same.
c. The bees sampling factors e are sufficiently close to 0 to have a negli-
gible probability of two or more bees moving at the same time. Thus
the distribution of bees over flower types changes by one bee moving
either from Y to B or from B to Y. (Here ~moving from Y to B"
means: previously the bee was at Y, now it has gone to B for a sam-
ple and since the payoff received at B is larger than the critical level
it decides to stay at B.)
d. We assume that, when going out sampling, the bee has been in Y
sufficiently long to have its critical level close to y~ny.
Theorem 2.2 Under the nbove assumptions the population unll stabilize in
the Ideal Free Distribution.8
Proof: Firstly, observe that, due to its e, each bee will go out sampling
the other color infinitely often. Hence, if the process stabilize~ in some
distribution of bees over Y and B, then it must be such that no single
bee can strictly improve its payoff by moving to the other color. Secondly,
observe that whenever a bee moves from Y to B we must have that y~ny G
6~(nB t 1), where ny and nB aze the numbers of bees before the move at
Y and B respectively.
We now define a potential junction (Monderer dc Shapley 1988) on the
distributions of bees as
ny ng
P(ny, ne) - y~ l~m -~ 6~ l~m, (2)
m-1 a~-1
where ~m-1 l~m is understood to be equal to 0. ff a bee moves from Y
to B, then the distribution changes from (ny,nB) to (ny - l,nB t 1). At
the same time the potential changes from P(ny,nB) to P(ny - l,nB f 1).
Now P(ny - 1,nB f- 1) - P(ny,ng) - ó~(ng ~ 1) - y~ny ~ 0 because the
bee decided to stay at B. Hence, with each bee movement the potential
strictly increases. Since there aze only finitely many distributions of the n
bees and since the bees will keep moving as long as possible, the potential
function will eventually reach its maximum. At this maximum we have
that y~ny ~ b~(nB t 1) and b~nB ~ y~(ny -~ 1); hence
y~ny ~ 6~nB (3)
and the population has reached the IFD. p
We remark that the stable situation that azises from all bees doing e-
sampling strategies, needs not be Pareto-optimal. Take for example 4 bees,
8 units of nectar at Y and 1 unit of nectar at B. For this situation the
IFD will be that all 4 bees will go to Y and the 1 unit at B is not being
consumed. Thus each bee is getting a payoff 2 all the time. The bees
could all improve their payoffs by visiting B in turns, giving each bee the9
average payoff 9~4 1 2. For a continuum of bees the distríbution obtained
from the E-sampling strategies will indeed be Pareto-optimal, ao that in a
natural environment with many bees and Sowers the IFD solution obtained
is practically Pareto-optimal.
It should be noted that, to derive the IFD result of Theorem 2.2 one
can also take the alternative potential function P' defined by
P'(ny,ns) - min{y~nr,b~nB} (q)
for ny ~ 0 and nB ~ 0, while P'(O,nB) - b~nB and P'(ny,0) - y~ny. Us-
ing this alternative potential function one can even show that a population
of E-sampling bees with different sizes will stabilize in the IFD. Here we as-
sume that a bee of size i consumes i times as much nectar as a bee of size 1.
Correspondingly, one should think of ny and nB as the total size of all bees
present at Y and B respectively. If we have a finite number of bees with
sizes in ~1,kJ, where k is the maximum size present, then the population
has the IFD if and only if y~ny ~ 6~(nB t i) and b~ng ) y~(ny tj), where
i(j) is the smallest size present at Y (resp. B). Notice that, if ny ~ 0 and
y~ny G 6~(nB t i), then y~(ny ~ j) G y~ny G 6~(nB -} i) G b~nB implying
that no bee will move from B to Y. On the other hand, a bee of size i
sampling from Y at B would decide to stay at B. There is at least one
bee of size i at Y and hence, by the E-sampling strategy at least one bee
will move from Y to B. Suppose that it has size x 1 i. Then the distribu-
tion changes from (ny, nB) to (ny - x, nB t x) and P'(tty - x, nB -~ x) -
min{y~(ny-x),b~(nptx)} 1 y~ny - min{y~ny,b~nB} - P'(y~ny,6~nB).
Hence, with each moving bee P' is strictly increasing and the process will
reach a(local) maximum after finitely many moves. At this (local) maxi-
mum the population is in IFD. Remazk that, if all bees have the same size,
then every local maximum of this alternative potential function P', as of




Figure 1: Mazkov chain for the e-sampling strategy
Let us now see what happens if we take a single bee for an experiment of
the following type (Figure 1). We have two artificial Bernoulli flowera Y
(yellow) and B(blue). Each time the bee visits the yellow flower it will
receive 1 unit of nectar with probability p and 0 units otherwise. Equiv-
alently, in a natural situation one can think of a patch of yellow flowers,
where a p-fraction of the flowers is full, while a(1 - p)-fraction is empty.
For the blue flower we have probability q for a full flower. Let, as before, E
be the bee's sampling factor. We assume that when sampling from Y to B
the bee's critical level will approximately be p and when sampling from B
to Y it will approximately be q. If the bee applies the s-sampling sttategy,
then its behavior corresponds with the Mazkov chain depicted in Figure 1.
In this figure Yl and B~ correspond to the sampling stages at the respective
colors; one gets there by sampling probability e and one decides to remain
(or else to return) with probability p and q respectively. Consequently, Y2
and Bz represent situations where the bee has decided to stay in the paz-
ticular color.
Computing the stationary distribution of this Mazkov chain, one finds that
the number of visits to Y relates to the number of visits to B as p-~ qeii
to q-}- pe, that is approximately as p to q if e is small. Thus we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.3 A bce applying the e-sampling strategy in a aingle-bee ezper-
iment will exhibit matehing the payoff prebabilities by the Jrequency oJ its
visits (the Matehing Law~.
Attitude Towards Risk
Consider a single bee foraging on two patches Y and B, in which all flowers
have a normally distributed nectaz supply with a common mean ~, but
where the distributions differ in vaziance; for the yellow flowers the variance
is y while for the blue ones it is b.
Theorem 2.4 Suppose that the bee is using the e-sampling stratcgy and
has a fized critieal level el to deeide whtther any fiower is Jull or tmpty.
Without loss oJ generaliiy we assume y G 6.
IJ el G p,, then the bec wil! aet as iJ it is risk averse, i.e. it will apend more
time on Y than on B.
IJ cl ) p,, then thc bee will act as iJ it is risk prone, i.e. it will apend more
time on B than on Y.
Proof: If cl c~, then the probability of getting a reward above the critical
level is larger for Y than it is for B (cf. Figure 2). So, when sampling, the
bee will decide to move to Y more often than it will decide to move to B.
Hence the result. The second part is similar. O
This result can be extended straightforwardly to continuous nectar supply
distributions Fy, FB on an interval [o, Q] which have a common mean p-
(o f(i)~2 and continuous derivatives fy, jB for which
a. j; (p -F x) - J;(p- z) for all x E [o, p -(c] and i- Y, B (which means













Figure 2: Two patches of flowers with normal nectaz distributions
b. there is x' E~0, Q-~c~ with
fr(x) ~ Je(x) for all x E (p - x',~c f x'),
Jy(x) c Ía(x) for all x E~~,p - x') u(p -F x'.~~.
It should be noted that the result depends on how Fy(cl) and FB(el) are
compazed. If Fy(el) C FB(cl), then an E-sampling bee with critical level
cl will favour the yellow patch, since F;(el) is the probability of having an
empty flower at i- Y, B. Thus, if Fy, FB aze nectaz supply distribution
functions on (0, oo) with Fy (r) G FB (r) for all r E(0, ao) (i.e. Fy strictly
dominates FB according to the ~first order stochastic dominance criterion"
(Fishburn 1976)), then every bee that uses an c-sampling strategy and
judges flowers full or empty according to some critical level, will favour the
yellow patch. This means that under these conditions, every bee would
visit more yellow flowers than blue flowers or, in other words, spend more
than half of its foraging time at the yellow patch.
One can also take nectar distributions as in Figure 3(or, e.g. negative
exponential distributions), in which most flowers are empty or have very
small nectar quantities. Such leptokertic distributions are very common in
nature (Shreiber 1993, Boker 1993). In case the bee forages on two flower13
CI
nectar - r
Figure 3: Two patches of flowers with decreasing nectar distributions
patches Y and B with distributions as in Figure 3, then the bee.will com-
paze the two patches. If we assume that jy and jB are continuous and cross
each other only once (e.g. jY starts above jB), then such a compazison also
falls in the first order atochastic dominance. ff a bee forages on such flower
patches and uses a critical level for switching between Y and B, then it
will stay mare frequently in the blue patch with the higher variance tha.n
in the yellow patch with the lower vaziance.
We would like to emphasize that the results presented do not depend on e.
All that matters is that e E(0,1) is sufficiently small to have a bee staying
in the same patch long enough to get a good estimate of the payoff in this
patch. One can even allow e to be payoff dependent, getting smaller with
high current payoffs and getting lazger with low current payoffs. The only
thing needed is that no matter at what color (patch) the bee is foraging,
with probability 1 it will eventually sample at another color (e.g. this con-
dition is satisfied if E is bounded away from 0). In the multi-bee model the
IFD result will still be valid if all individual bees have (sufficiently small)
different e's.14
3 The Failures Strategy
In the previous section the bee's "decision" of going out to sample the
other color was independent of the payoffs received in the current color; it
was determined solely by the innate sampling factor e. In thia aection we
present a foraging strategy which will make the bee move to another color
after engaging a certain number of consecutive empty flowera. Recall that
empty is to be interpreted as ~be)ow critical level". The bee is asaumed to
behave as a finite automaton (Neyman 1985, Ben- Porath k Peleg 1987,
Kalai 1988).
This automaton strategy correaponds to the well known "area- reatricted
seazch~ (Real et al. 1990) of animal behavior, which was termed "near-far"
by Motro dc Shmida (1992). The near-far atrategy is A(1,1) (see below),
a special case of our automaton strategy where the bee uses only the last
flower visited to evaluate the current patch. It meana: atay in the patch
as long as you find food and leave otherwise. Similar strategies have been
reviewed by Houston et al. (1982). Experimental atudiea reveal this near-
faz behavior (see in Motro dc Shmida 1992).
Let us return to the experiment with two artificial flowera Y(yellow) and
B (blue) that give 1 unit of nectar with probability p and q respectively
(and 0 units otherwise). As already mentioned above, obaervationa indicate
that the frequencies of visits by the bee will match theae probabilities. The
event of receiving 1 shall be called a succes, receiving 0 is a failure.
Definition 3.1 Let y, b E N. The finite automaton A(y, 6) is yiven 6y:
a. leave Y aJter y eonsccutive failures and move to B,
b. leave B aJter b conseeutive Jailures and move to Y.
As an example we have depicted automaton A(3, 2) in Figure 4-a, where
Y4 indicates the automaton state of being at Y while the last k consecutive15
D
Figure 4: (a) Automaton A(3, 2) and (b) related Markov chain
yellow visits were failures (k - 0,1, 2). Obviously Bo and B~ are to be
interpreted similazly. The automaton corresponds with a Mazkov chain on
the states Yo, Yl, Y~, Bo, Bl, which is depicted in Figure 4-b. In this figure
and elaewhere in this paper we write p to denote 1- p and ' q for 1- q. This
Mazkov chain in turn corresponds to the transition matrix T given by:
Yo Y, Y~ Bo B,
Yo ~p p 0 0 Ol
Yl p 0 p 0 0
T- Ys p 0 0 p 0
Bo 0 0 0 q q
B, q 0 0 q 0
If the bee uses A(3,2), then we can compute its frequencies of visits to Y
and B by finding the stationary distribution ~r -(yo, y,, yz, bo, 61) of T. The
frequency of visits to Y is yo -}. yl ~ y2 and that to B is 60 -}. 61. The vector x
is nonnegative and adding its components gives 1. Furthermore a has the
property that aT -~r. Using A(3,2) the bee would confirm the matching16
law if and only if
YotyitY2 -P~(Ptq)
botó1 -4~(Pt9)
The equation aT - A yields
Yi - pYo, Ys - P~Yo, bi - 96o and bo - (pI9s)Yo-
Hence we find the equations
(5)
s i - pa
YotYitYs-Yo(1-FPtP)-Yo ,
P
1 - qs ps(1 - q2)
botbi-bo(lt9)-bo -Yo .
4 9s4
So, if we let j(2,3) denote the ratio of the frequencies of visits to Y and
B, then
j(2,3) - frequency of visits to Y- qqs(1 - ps)
(6) frequency of visits to B pps(1 -'qs)
and the automaton A(2, 3) is matching if and only if j(2,3) - p~q, which
is equivalent to:
Ps~s 9s~s
1 - p~ - 1 - qs ~ (7)
Similazly one can show the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 The finitc automaton A(y,b) matehta thc payoff probabili-




We would like to remazk that there aze infinitely many (y, b) E Rt for
which (8) holds, because the function y t-. ~ is strictly decreasing on
(0, oo) from oo to 0. In fact we have the following result.
Theorem 3.3 Let 6 E (0,0.5) and let M E N bc auch that (1 - 6)M'1 G
46(1 - 6M). Then, jor all 6 C p C q C 1 - b there exist y,6 E (1,M] unth
P2P~` 9s9
1-p~ - 1-qa17
Proof: If p' p - qq, then y- b- 1 gives the result. Otherwise, assume
without loss of generality that pp c qq. Then
9~4~ 994M-1 0.25(1 - Ó)~-I
1- qM -(1 - qni)~(1 - 9) ~(1 - 6~)I(1 - 6)
C ó(1 - 6) C p~. (9)
B continuit there exists 6 E 1 M with N ~ Y Y , J ~ - PP - i-v' O
For any p, q-situation of yellow and blue flowers with p, q E (ó, l- á] this
theorem provides the existence of real numbers y, 6 E[1, M] for which
pa' r~
~-p, -~. However, to have an automaton for the bee, we need to
have numbers in { 1,2, ..., M}. We therefore propose to see (y, b) as a
convex combination of pure pairs (y', b') E{1, 2, ..., M}~ and to have
the bee perform an initial randomization over the pure sutomata A(y', 6')
according to the weights of the convex combination. Then, in expectation,
the bee wiil leave Y after y consecutive failures and it will leave B after b
consecutive failures. In view of the bee's bounded recall, it is worthwhile
to notice that with M- 2 one can handle ó as small as 0.22, while with
M- 3 one can handle 6 as small as 0.18. Thus, for all p, q E [0.22, 0.78]
one can obtain matching with automata A(y, 6) with y, b E{1, 2}.
For a bee doing matching with an automaton of above type, the number
of consecutive empty flowers it allows itself to encounter in yellow can be
different from that in blue. One can think of the bee as having an internal
mechanism by which, after some rough estimation of p and q, the natural
numbers y' and 6' aze selected. It is not necessazily true that the bee can
use an automaton of type A(x, x) since there does not always exist a real
number x 1 1 with ~- ~ If for example one takes p- 0.6 and 1-v 1-v'.
q - 0.8, then such x does not exist. However, we have the following result.




Proof: If p- q or if p- q, then one can take x- 1. Now let p G q C p.
Using an automaton A(x, x) the ratio of the frequencies of visits to Y and
B is (cf. example A(3, 2) above)
99 (1 - P~) (11)
Í(x, x) - pP (1 - 9)
Then limsy,o j(x,x) - 0 and j(1,1) - q~p ~ p~q. Hence, by continuity
there exists a~ 1 with j(x,x) - p~q, or equivalently ~-~. p
Obviously a similar result can be obtained for q C p c q. Remazk that
the condition of this theorem is easily satisfied if p and q aze small. Such
conditions aze frequently observed in natural situations (Shreiber 1993).
Suppose we have finitely many bees foraging on two patches Y and B
consisting of Bernoulli flowers. At Y each flower gives 1 unit of nectaz
with probability p. At B each flower is full with probability q. We assume
that the nectar supply probabilities are independent of the numbers of
visiting bees. If in this situation each individual bee determines, by its
internal mechanism, an automaton to forage on Y and B, then each of
these individuals will approximately spend ~ of its foraging time on Y
and ~ on B. Even stronger, we can say that for each individual bee the
probability of being at Y at time t converges to ~q. Thus, by the atrong
law of large numbers the fraction of the numbers of bees we encounter at
Y at time t converges to ~ as t and the number of bees increase. That is,
a~-pazt of the bee population will be at Y, while the others, a~a-part,
will be at B for large t and a large number of bees. In other words, one
would observe the ideal free distribution.
IFD with a continuum of bees
Consider a continuum of identical bees that aze all using the failures strat-
egy A(r, s) with r, s E N, to forage on patches Y and B that have respec-
tively total nectar supply y and 6. The quantities aze shazed at each color19
by the present bees. Given critical levels for the bees at Y and B, the
"full-flower" probabilities, p and q respectively, are determined by the pro-
portions of bees currently present in each of the patches. This population
of bees can be distributed according to the IFD, i.e. there are full-flower
probabilities p and q, and related critical levels, for Y an B reapectively,
such that each bee using A(r, s) is matching p~q, while the ratio of the
fractions of bees at Y and B is y~b. More formally:
Theorem 3.5 IJ y~ b and ya ~ br, fhen there asiet p,q E (0,1) aaeh that
y- 99'(1-P)-P
b f(r~s) - pP (1 - 4') - 9 (12)
Proof: For q E (0, 6~y] define:
9(q) - (y~b)~(1 - 9y~6)'(1 - (1 - q)')
(13)
(1 - q)~(1 - (1 - qy~b)r)
Then g is continuous on (0, b~y] with g(6~y) - 0 and with
limylo 9(4) -(y~b)~ limalo i1 llay e.
- (yIb)2lima1o rv 6 11-av ~'- (14)
-~'-~~1.
ry~A - r0
By continuity of g there exists q' E (0, b~y] with g(q') - 1. Now q' and
p' - yq'~b are as desired. O
Note that this theorem is a static result for the existence of IFD with
matching bees doing A(r,s). The result does not provide a dynamic process
of how to reach the IFD. We have to assume a continuum of bees in order
to have p and q not being affected by single bees moving from one atate
of the automaton to another state of the automaton. The proportions of
bees in the states of the automaton have to be independent of time. With
a finite number of bees the probabilities p and q would always depend on
the precise number of bees in those states.20
Attitude Towards Risk
Consider the single-bee situation of foraging on two patches Y and B, where
all flowers have a normally distributed nectar supply with a common mean
ta. The yellow flowers have vaziance y, the blue ones have vaziance 6.
Theorem 3.8 Suppoae the bec ia uaing a Jailurea atrategy and haa a fized
critienl level el. Withoui losa oJ generality asaume y C 6.
Ij cl G p, then the bce will aet as if it ia riak averae, i.e. it will apend mort
time on Y than on B.
IJ el ~ p, then the óee vnll att as iJ it ia riak prone, i.e. it will apend more
time on B than on Y.
Proof: If cl c ~c, then the probability of getting a full flower is larger for
Y than for B (Figure 2 in Section 2). Hence the probability p of getting
a full Y flower is lazger than q for a B flower. Since the bee's mechanism
will find an automaton to match p and q, the bee will spend more time in
Y than in B. The second part is similar. p
Remark that this result can also be extended to apply to other nectaz
distribution functions, like the ones discussed for the e-sampling strategy.
Finally for this section we like to remazk that we have only considered
finite automata of the type: leave Y( B) after y(b) consecutive failures.
However, one could also examine automata of a more general type. Let
S, Sy and SB be finite non-empty sets of states with S - Sy U SB and
Sy r1 SB -~. We can describe a foraging automaton for the bee as a map
T: S x{0,1} --. S with the interpretation that a bee in state s E Sy is
visiting a yellow flower; if this particulaz yellow flower is full (empty) then
the bee moves to state T(s, l) (resp. T(s,0)). Further research is required
to fully understand the possibilities of obtaining matchíng and IFD results
by means of these general type foraging automata.zl
4 Discussion and Related Literature
The Matching Law
Many studies, articles, and even special books have been devoted to the
phenomena of "the Matching Law." (Some main and recent references
are Simon 1956, Herrenstein 1970, Heyman 1979, Commons et al. 1982,
Houston et al. 1982, Houston 1983, Staddon 1983, Davison dt McCazthy
1988, Staddon dc ííorner 1989). The reader of the above literature will
probably be confused (as we aze) by the rich and complicated details of the
experimental results as weU as by the theoretical analyses. There are very
many versions of the matching law mathematical function (compaze for
example Krebs k Kacelnik 1991 to Houston dc Sumida 1987 to Davison di
McCazthy 1988 to the commentary by Herrenstein dc Vaughan in Maynazd
Smith 1984).
In this study we focussed on one main issue related to the matching law:
why the animal in an aztificial binary choice setting behaves "irrationaly"
and does not go exclusively to the resource with the higher probability?
lnstead, the matching law reveals (Krebs dt Kacelnik 1991) that the an-
imal allocates its long-run behavior to two alternatives in proportion to
the reward it obtains from them. To answer this question, we presented
boundedly rational strategies for which the irrational matching behavior ia
compatible with the equilibrium conditions of the natural IFD.
We have presented foraging rules that lead the forager to match over
time the reward probabilities by the fractions of the visits to the alterna-
tives. However, one should not confuse this matching law with "probability
matching" (Maynard Smith 1984). Probability matching is a foraging rule
where, at each point in time, the forager is choosing an alternative accord-
ing to the obscrvcd full flower probabilities at the respective patches. Whilc
probability matching is a moment-to-moment foraging rule, the matching22
law describes the average behavior of the forager over an asymptotically
long period of time.
Learning R~iles
As Maynard Smith (1984) points out, a leazning rule (i.e. a foraging strat-
egy) that we observe in animals should have several properties:
a. It should have the relativc payoff sum (RPS) property, which says
that, after a sufficiently long period of time, the probability of doing
a certain act should equal the total payoff received so far for doing
this act, divided by the total payoff received so far for all a,cta.
b. None of the available acts should ever fall to zero probability, since
the enviconment might change.
c. Any naive animal should start with some prior probabilities of per-
forming the different acts.
d. Recent payoffs should have a bigger effect on behavior than early ones
(discount factor).
A strategy having these properties is Harley's RPS rule (Hazley 1981, May-
nazd Smith 1984). For a two-choices situation (Y, B) this rule is defiaed as
follows (Hazley 1981):
Let ry, rB 1 0(residual values) and let 0 c x c 1(memory factor). Let
P;(t) denote the payoff in i E {Y,B} at time t E N. Now let S;(0) - r; and
for t ~ 1 define
S;(t) - xS;(t - 1) -~ (1 - x)r; ~- P,(t). (15)
At time t choose alternative i E {Y, B} with probability
SrÍt - 1)
16
I~(t) - Sy(t - 1) t SB(t - 1) ()23
"In words, the (this) RPS rule says the following: display most frequently
the behaviour which has, up to the present, paid the most, but only in
proportion, roughly, to its cumulative payoff relative to the overall total"
(Hazley 1981). Although this rule is fairly simple, the foraging animal
is required to adjust its probablities of choosing either Y or B at each
point in time. Compared to it we have presented an explicit ~moleculaz"
(umoment to moment" in Krebs 8z Kacelnik 1991 terms) strategy that has
the above properties, but for which the foraging animal will only switch
every once in a while. Notice that Hazley's rule assumes the animal to
update probabilities at all time points and chooses Y or B independent of
the patch it is currently visiting. We do not believe that bees are capable
of updating and computing probabilities before each visit (10 tó 40 visits
per minute!). Our foraging strategies give the same results while the bee is
following very simple movement rules.
Milinski Fishes
Our E-sampling strategy explains explicitly the dynamics in which "Milin-
ski fishesn reach the IFD (Milinski 1979, 1984, Godin dz Keenleside 1984,
Milinski 8c Pazker 1991). Each fish has to remember only an estimate of the
average payoff received so faz in the old resource, and to compare it with
the current payoff in the new food source when sampling. If the current
payoff is higher, the fish stays; if it is lower, it goes back to the old food
source. This biological behavior corresponds to the potential function of
Monderer 8c Shapley (1988). Milinski dc Pazker ( 1991, page 144) have a
stationary model of the IFD with foraging fishes, but they do not have an
explicit dynamic model by which the fishes can reach the IFD. Their model
(including Parker 8c Sutherland 1986) can be viewed as a special case of the
short-run stable matching of Peleg 8t Shmida (1992) where the fishes' dif-
ferent competitive weights correspond to the bees' different handling times24
(technological abilities, sensu Selten 1978).
Godin dc Keenleside (1984) have shown experimentally that the IFD can
be achieved through "sampling." However, no explicit strategy has been
suggested in the literature of how fish cazried out the sampling procedure.
Our e-sampling strategy corresponds to the ~Major-Minor behavior"of bees,
which has been observed in bumblebees by Heinrich (1979). The bumble-
bee visits mainly a certain flower type, the major one, but once in a while
it samples (doing minoring) other flower types. It would be interesting to
investigate how an indivdual bee's pazameter E is influenced by its life his-
tory and its environment.
Milinski (1984) and Godin k Keenleside (1984) received iateresting results
when comparing the switching rate between two resources of 6sh with differ-
ent competitive ability: Individuals experiencing a high feeding rate (high
payoff) tend to switch patches less frequently than those individuals that
received lower payoffs. Theae tesults can be explained by our e-sampling
strategy (and also by the failure strategy). The fishes which are receiv-
ing less, reach the threshhold of leaving more frequently, and the initiative
to sample somewhere eLse is greater when e-sampling is payoff dependent
(wíth e increasing with low payoffs and decreasing with high payoffs).
Attitude Towards Risk
Our model explains in a simple way (without the need ofutility theory) the
well-known pattern in animal behavior of risk aversion and riak proneness
(Real k Caraco 1986, Stephens dc Krebs 1986, Krebs da Kacelnik 1991,
McNamara dt Houston 1992): In an environment in which the resource is
normally distributed, the critical level can be interpreted as an existing
condition for the animal. If the critical level is below the resource mean
(Figure 2), then the animals should behave as if they aze risk averse, while25
if the critical level is above the mean, then they ahould behave as if they
are risk prone. Our model predicts only a tendency to visit one of the
resources more frequently and not to make an exclusive choice for one of
the resources. In the case where nectaz is distributed as in Figure 3, no
matter what its critical level is, the bee will prefer the blue flower.
The elucidated review on risk sensitivity by McNamara dc Houston
(1992) has technically similar resulta to our pointa on attitude towards
risk. However, they ask themselves which alternative the animal would
prefer, while we find out what would happen to the animal if we take into
account the observations of IFD and matching. In their model the critical
level is a kind of evolutionazy knowledge which, in a sense uses complete
information about the environment. In our model the animal's actions are
governed only by its own recent experiences and no complete information
is required.
Bounded Rationality and Myopic Learning
Our approach to studying foraging behavior is quite different from the "op-
timal foraging theory" used in ecology (Pyke et al. 1977, Krebs dt Kacelnik
1991, Stephens dc Krebs 1986, Bernstein et al. 1988). In optimalforaging
theory the decision to leave a patch (resource alternative) is based on a
compazison to the surroundings, in other worda, it assumea that the ani-
mal has complete information and a powerful memory and computational
ability. Our basic approach ia that the animal uees "bounded memory"
and makes its decisions only on the basis of its own recent experience. It
does not know its competitor's moves~payoffs. It even may not know that
it is involved in a game situation. The animal uses very simple decision
rules to decide when to leave a patch (8ower type), to decide where to go,
and to decide whether or not to stay at the "new" patch. In auch very
fast biological activities (one bee makes very many visits per minute) the26
animals use mainly their short term memory (Menzel 1985, 1990) and the
movement rules depend on very ahort recall (e.g. remember the laat 1-3
flowers) and very simple calculations (Real et al. 1990, Real 1991, 1992).
These issues are related to myopic learning models (Monderer da Shapley
1988, Fudenberg dc Kreps 1991, Milgrom k Roberts 1991, Monderer k Sela
1993) and to theory on bounded rationality (Kalai 1988, Selten 1990, Au-
mann 1992). We believe that bees and most other animals are not able
to do sophisticated calculation of probabilities (e.g. as in the RPS-rule of
Harley (1981), the learning rule by McNamaza dc Houston (1985) or in
leazning rules that require bayesian updating) and can neither update ex-
pected payoffs by functiona that comprise long recall of history. Of courae,
in a matching experiment the reward probabilities are not known to the
bee; these are known only to the researcher. One of the main limitations
of many of the previous models is that they analyze the situation as if the
bee does know those probabilities.
This bounded rationality approach is explained nicely in Boyd k Rich-
erson 1985 (p. 93) when they address the issue of how animals and people
apply Bayesian rationality: "simple rules of thumb (... called heuristics by
psychologists) may greatly reduce cognitive complexity of decisions but atill
result in behavior that closely approximates normatively rational behavior
in some restricted range of environments ... Theae heuristica often work
well but occasionally lead to behavior that is irrational according to canons
of Bayesian rationality.r
In the foregoing pages we have presented an explicit model in which
simple decision rules, that need only very short recall and only elementary
calculations, can dictate an optimal foraging strategy. We have seen that
finite automata with very few states appear to be appropriate tools for such
tasks (Ben-Porath 1991, Ben-Porath 8t Peleg 1987). Our model stands in
agreement with recent experiments of foraging animals which reveal thatanimals take into account only the last 1-3 rewards when making ahort-
term decisions (sensu Menzel 1990). It also fits the "melioration approach"
(Herrenstein k Vaughan 1980) that animals use very simple choice rules
which lead them to behave (sub)optimally in very complex natural situa-
tions (Houston et al. 1982, Hinson di Staddon 1983 and Boyd k Richerson
1985). To an outside observer this simple behavior looks very sophiaticated
and complicated as if they use utility functions, probability updating and
complicated calculus. We believe that the same approach can explain some
"irrationalT behavior in economics and sociology; some "bounded rational"
- ad hoc - strategies that aze optimal under pazticulaz natural conditions
may look very irrational in artificial situations. This is illuatrated by the
compazison of the matching experiment and the IFD phenomenón in na-
ture.
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